













































































Information law will never be the same
One cannot fail to be impressed by Egbert Dommering’s long and rich list of 
contributions during his tenure as Professor for Information Law at the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam. He built the Institute for Information Law (ivir) into one of 
the leading institutes of the world in this area. This author cannot but add his 
voice to the chorus of praise, respect and admiration for Egbert Dommering’s 
achievements.
Yet as Dommering steps down from his chair, it is perhaps interesting to look 
not into the past, but rather into the future. Could Dommering be the last great 
professor of classical Information Law? Will his successors – at the University of 
Amsterdam but also elsewhere – have to re-invent their field of law? This essay 
argues that, for a number of reasons – in addition to Dommering’s impact – in-
formation law will never be the same. The object of information law has mutat-
ed. The scope for public intervention has been rolled back. The implementation 
of any form of public intervention has been made more difficult. Last but not 
least, information law has seen its main topics expropriated. The future infor-
mation law is thus likely to look quite different from what we know now.
The object of information law has mutated
At first sight, the object of information law is simply information, but a closer 
look reveals a more complex picture.
Indeed, information law is primarily concerned with the issues arising from 
the use of information within a specific technological context. In his inaugu-
ral lecture, Dommering went through all of them: the written press, television 
and radio broadcasting, post as well as telecommunications. Each of them used 
to represent a stand-alone, autonomous and complete technological system. 
Jumping back 30 years in time, we would have found the following situation.
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The written press had its own technological chain, from authors producing 
manuscripts, to editing (including translating), typesetting, printing and dis-
tributing.
Television comprised a system where a number of players (actors, writers, pro-
ducers, technicians, et cetera) collaborate to produce some content which is 
packaged by a broadcaster into a general programme (with its own flavour), 
which is then broadcast using a specific dedicated infrastructure (terrestrial 
antennas or cable) and received using dedicated terminals (tv sets). The radio 
broadcasting system was similar, with its own infrastructure (save for shared 
antenna masts) and terminals (radio sets).
Postal services constituted yet another system, where users generate postal items, 
which are entrusted to a service provider, which takes care of sorting and distrib-
uting these items. Here as well, the medium (paper), the infrastructure (person-
nel, sorting machines, vehicles) and the terminals (mailboxes) are dedicated.
Finally, telecommunications, while often associated with post on the Conti-
nent, were also conducted on a dedicated, autonomous system, where users 
used terminals (telephones) to access a network (made up of lines and switch-
es), whereby they could connect to other users.
Of course, it is possible for legal scholarship to deal with these systems in 
a more conceptual fashion. In fact, it is even necessary, or otherwise the law 
would have to deal with wires, electromagnetic waves, et cetera. Concepts such 
as emitter/receiver, content, signal, et cetera allow the law to abstract from the 
actual physical elements of these various systems. The law can then deal with 
these systems in a way which intuitively appears more adequate, in that the 
concepts distil the essential characteristics of the technology, as far as society is 
concerned, for the purposes of legislating and regulating. Nevertheless, these 
concepts remain tightly associated with their respective technological system, 
which is why we could speak of the law of the press, postal law, telecommunica-
tions law and media/broadcasting law. Each of these systems was fully compre-
hended by its own area of law. Each of these areas of law was perceived as highly 
specialized and distinct – if not autonomous – within the broader legal order. 
Hence information law was concerned with information as it is generated, pro-
cessed and circulated within a given technological system. 
Convergence
Now the underlying technology is changing, a phenomenon usually referred to 
as convergence. Convergence has been ongoing since the 1990s, and it has been 
described in detail elsewhere.1 For the purposes of this contribution, the most 











































































important implication of convergence is that these stand-alone technological 
systems are merged into, and replaced by, an integrated whole.2 That integrat-
ed whole3 is more general and more complex. It is also much more dynamic, 
with a higher rate and a quicker pace of innovation. It cannot easily be compre-
hended as one massive system; rather, for various reasons,4 it has come to be 
conceived as a set of functionalities (or layers) interacting with one another.
The impact of convergence is compounded by the contemporaneous liberaliza-
tion process. Not only is the technology more complex, but a larger number of 
firms are operating it, in competition but also very often in cooperation with 
one another. The object of the law is no longer a real and discrete system, but 
rather the virtual ‘network of networks’ resulting from the operations of these 
various firms.
From a legal perspective, it is tempting to treat convergence as an evolution 
rather than a revolution. Dealing with convergence would then imply that the 
legal conceptual apparatus mentioned above evolves to a greater level of so-
phistication in order to tackle a more complex technological object. Indeed a 
number of authors, including Dommering himself,5 have presented complex 
models, usually centred on production chains or layers, upon which to base the 
law and regulation of the converged sector.6 In my opinion, this approach is 
misguided, both statically and dynamically. From a static perspective, it fails to 
acknowledge that convergence changes both the structure of the sector and the 
way in which it operates. For policymakers and academics to continue expand-
ing resources to try to encompass the whole sector in a legal and regulatory 
framework is inefficient, especially if the public policy objectives underpin-
ning legal or regulatory intervention are already partly or wholly met. From a 
dynamic perspective and perhaps more fundamentally, innovation can be af-
fected – most likely adversely – if it is constrained by an all-encompassing legal 
and regulatory framework. 
Of course, information lawyers must remain abreast of technological develop-
ments in order to understand what they are working on. Nevertheless, the ob-
ject of information law has changed.
The remit of public authorities is reduced
Beyond the fact that its object of study (information) is mutating, the ‘law’ in 
information law is also changing. More precisely, the mandate of the public 
authorities is reduced as a consequence of liberalization,7 in ways which some-











































































times do not receive the attention they deserve. A key element of all liberaliza-
tion processes is the separation of regulatory and operational functions.8 This 
implies of course institutional separation, in that a regulatory authority is 
created, separate from and independent of any firm, including the incumbent 
(former monopolist). Beyond that, once they are established as separate insti-
tutions, the incumbent and the regulatory authority must also concentrate 
on their respective functions. Just like incumbents had to learn (sometimes 
painfully) to leave regulation to the authority, regulatory authorities must also 
learn to focus on regulation and to let go of operational matters. This is part 
and parcel of the choice for liberalization of the market.
Once a policy choice in favour of liberalization has been made, the only logi-
cal starting point must be that the operation of the information sector escapes 
the legislative and regulatory remit. In other words, operations9 are primarily 
a matter for the market to decide, according to what customers demand and 
what firms can supply. It follows that public intervention must be subject to a 
prior finding that the market has failed to deliver – the so-called ‘market fail-
ure’ test – which can be more or less stringent.10 Public authorities then work 
bottom-up instead of top-down: they only step in when the market is not ad-
equately functioning, in line with proportionality and other principles of good 
governance. It was seen above that the object of information law has changed, 
which makes the use of all-encompassing models inadequate. The change in 
the remit of public authorities only strengthens this conclusion. 
Unfortunately, much policymaking and academic work concerning the need to 
introduce new technologies, to carry out investments, to make services avail-
able to everyone, et cetera, still reads as if policymaking flowed seamlessly into 
operations, themselves still in the hands of the incumbent.11 
Yet a paradox looms: whilst lawmakers and regulators must let go and let mar-
kets evolve on their own motion, they must also be able to judge whether mar-
ket performance meets expectations when they carry out a market-failure test. 
In order to do that, they must therefore have a benchmark of how the electronic 
communications sector should evolve, so as to be able to make an assessment. 
Research in information law can contribute to solving this apparent paradox 
by working out the theoretical underpinnings of current regulatory trends. If 
for the purposes of discussion it is assumed that the regulatory framework for 
electronic communications represents the state of the art, the answer lies in its 











































































two most important design principles, namely (i) reliance on economic analysis 
(as evidenced by a substantive alignment with competition law) and (ii) techno-
logical neutrality. The former implies that the law moves away from technolog-
ical concepts,12 towards economic and functional concepts. This can be seen 
most clearly in the regulation of market power (the so-called ‘smp regime’), 
but universal service regulation has also been cast mostly in economic terms.13 
Accordingly, information law and regulation can be formulated in economic/
functional terms (no bottlenecks, no network externalities, adequate market 
performance, etc.). The latter principle is still a work in progress.14 
Amongst possible interpretations of technological neutrality, the most power-
ful and most meaningful would entail that public authorities do not interfere 
with technological choices which properly belong to the marketplace.15 This 
would dictate that the action of public authorities be carried out at a certain 
level of abstraction and avoid as much as possible to rely on technological cat-
egories which would imply a choice in favour or against a certain technology. 
The two principles (reliance on economic analysis and technological neutrality) 
point in the same direction.
Implementation is made more difficult
In addition to the above, information law must pay more attention to imple-
mentation issues than had traditionally been the case. In earlier times, the law 
was  implemented  in  a  command-and-control  fashion,  especially  where  the 
object was a self-contained autonomous system controlled by the State or by a 
tightly-regulated private monopoly. Under these circumstances, it was under-
standably more interesting for academics to focus on substantive law than on 
implementation issues.
Now proper implementation is no longer a given. Accordingly implementa-
tion issues take centre stage, as a result partly of the two phenomena already 
discussed. Firstly, due to convergence, the object of information law mutates 
into a complex ‘network of networks’ involving a multitude of firms. It is much 
harder to implement information law without giving rise to some unintended 
effects (or externalities) on one part or another of this virtual ‘network of net-
works’. Secondly, liberalization reduces the substantive remit of information 
law and hence turns these firms into participants in the legal and regulatory 
process, into stakeholders, together with consumers, interest groups, et cetera. 
Yet other factors also play a role, first and foremost market integration and glo-
balization. National borders no longer provide a convenient and stable bound-











































































ary for information law to be implemented. Rather, factor mobility across bor-
ders reduces the ability of public authorities to exert their power.
In  practice,  as  implementation  becomes  a  central  issue,  public  authorities 
have developed a number of sophisticated devices to enable substantive policy 
choices to be implemented in this more difficult context. First and foremost, a 
regulatory model was adopted,16 whereby specialized regulatory authorities 
monitor and, when needed, intervene in a given sector, against the backdrop of 
an open competitive market, by trying to affect the incentives of market play-
ers. Secondly, public authorities began to rely on non-traditional instruments 
such as soft law (communications, notices, guidelines, et cetera) and self- or co-
regulation. Thirdly, authorities began to collaborate across borders, giving rise 
to innovative institutions such as networks of regulatory authorities.
These developments affect not only the practice of information law, but also 
its academic pursuit. Information law therefore must encompass all the topics 
related to implementation, such as regulatory theory and institutional law (ec 
and national) and theory. 
The topics of information law are expropriated 
The last and perhaps most fundamental reason why information law must 
change is that its main research topics find themselves expropriated.
Traditionally, economic regulation – including market access, market struc-
ture, relationships between market parties and relationships with end-users 
– has been a central topic of information law, in sectors such as telecommu-
nications, post and broadcasting, with specific solutions reached in each sec-
tor. With the opening of markets, it became generally acknowledged that any 
sector-specific economic regulation should be based on sound economic analy-
sis.17 It was then only natural that sector-specific regulation should gravitate 
towards competition law, the general area of law which seeks to apply economic 
analysis to the resolution of market regulation issues. Whether sector-specific 
regulation must be aligned with, or ultimately abandoned in favour of, com-
petition law can stay open;18 it remains that, at the academic level, the part of 
information law dealing with economic regulation is firmly in the intellectual 
orbit of competition law. 
Similarly, the more social aspects of economic regulation, including the provi-
sion of various information services to all citizens – by way of service public, 











































































‘Daseinsversorgung’ or however legal systems conceive this – have ceased to be 
specific problems of electronic communications law or media law. In fact, the 
introduction of universal service in the early days of telecommunications liber-
alization19 led to a more general discussion on the place of services of general 
economic interest in the architecture of ec law.20 Similarly, the intense strug-
gle around the financing of public broadcasting cleared the way for the general 
debate on the financing of public services, including the famous Altmark deci-
sion21 and its policy offspring.22
Pluralism and freedom of expression have also been taken outside of the circle 
of information law specialists, where Dommering and ivir play a prominent 
role. To a certain extent, the classical approach allowed for a solution such as 
European content rules, so deeply wed to a specific technology, to flourish and 
become its own area of study.23 Similarly, the press – written as well as audiovi-
sual press – enjoyed by and large a different freedom of expression than the rest 
of us,24 which also gave a specific flavour to information law. 
In  both  cases,  the  specificity  of  information  law  has  been  severely  eroded, 
first and foremost by convergence. Convergence heralds the fragmentation of 
broadcasting and the rise of narrowcasting, rendering content rules untenable. 
It also opens a space between the press and the general public, for hybrid phe-
nomena such as blogging and social networking. At the same time, pluralism 
and freedom of expression rank high on the general political agenda as cultural 
identities are being re-invented.
Although this author feels much less at home in these topics, a similar story 
could be told about privacy and security. Privacy law started as the preserve of 
a relatively small community of specialists around the world, among whom 
here as well ivir researchers under the leadership of Dommering are leaders. 
Similarly, network security was a relatively esoteric and technical topic. Today, 
these issues have been thrust to the foreground, as information and communi-
cation came to assume an ever-increasing significance in our lives. We depend 
on information and communication (especially in digital and electronic form) 
to an extent which we sometimes forget or fail to appreciate (until we are de-
prived of them due to a failure), and our lives are also caught by information 
and communication facilities to a greater extent than we often believe. Privacy 
and security issues have been further highlighted following the tragic terrorist 
attacks of this decade.
The first three headings of this essay essentially chronicled how information 











































































law is coming into the mainstream: its object mutates into a complex ‘network 
of networks’ not unlike many other economic sectors (financial sector, trans-
port, etc.), the role of public authorities is aligned with what is customary in 
other economic sectors and implementation issues can no longer be ignored. 
As the present heading indicates, this cannot but have consequences for in-
formation law as such. For all the main topics briefly outlined above, a similar 
pattern emerges. Topics which were central to information law, mastered and 
controlled by the information law community, become less specific to informa-
tion law, start to matter beyond information systems and are appropriated by 
larger policy and academic communities.25 Under these circumstances, it will 
be increasingly difficult for information law and its community to retain their 
specificity and their autonomy.
This creates both opportunities and threats for the information law commu-
nity. On the one hand, information law specialists typically have a head start on 
each of these main topics, with which they have been busy for decades already. 
As these topics spill over the boundaries of information law and become part of 
a more general policy and academic topic, information law specialists have the 
opportunity to leverage their expertise into these broader topical communities. 
On the other hand, if information law specialists remain focused on specific 
technological systems, their technological focus will obscure the link between 
their work and these more general topics, much to their disadvantage.
Conclusion 
In the light of the above, the future of information law could be much different 
from what we have seen so far.
In the eyes of this author, the phenomena described in the previous paragraphs 
pose a serious challenge to the specificity of information law as a field of law 
and of academic research. Because its object mutates, information law must 
move to a higher level of abstraction, away from the technical specificities of 
stand-alone technological systems. It must also accommodate a rollback in 
the role of public authorities, which also leads to a higher level of abstraction 
when moving to economic and functional categories. Implementation issues 
gain more importance, which requires expanding into general issues of insti-
tutional law, regulatory theory, et cetera. Finally and more crucially, the core 
topics which made information law specific are expropriated to the benefit of a 
larger community.











































































How can this challenge be addressed, especially as regards academic research? 
A first step could certainly be to expand the scientific base by emphasizing in-
ter-disciplinarity, so as to achieve a deeper understanding of the central topics 
of information law. Armed with knowledge from economics, communications 
science, psychology or sociology, information law specialists can more easily 
apply their expertise beyond the classical boundaries of information law. In 
this respect, in this author’s main research area, competition law and economic 
regulation, the ability to understand, work with and even exploit economic sci-
ence is indispensable.
Beyond that, it might be advisable to shift the articulation of information law 
away  from  technological  systems  (media  law,  telecommunications  law,  law 
of the press, postal law, et cetera) and towards topics such as those outlined 
above (economic regulation, privacy, security, freedom of expression, culture 
and pluralism). In so doing, information law specialists are forced to move to a 
more abstract level and will be better able to share their knowledge and exper-
tise with the rest of the legal academic community.
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